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Yoda in the Pentagon
Andrew Marshall’s lessons for strategic forecasting
There are numbers that count, and numbers that don’t. Andrew Marshall has spent a
lifetime trying to assess which ones are which. In October 1973, Arab states attacked
Israel with overwhelming numerical dominance. The Egyptians deployed some 650,000
soldiers — a massive military force in its own right. Syria, Iraq and other Arab states
added another quarter of a million troops. Against these 900,000 enemies Israel could
muster no more than 375,000 soldiers, and 240,000 of those were from the reserves.
But the war was really a battle of tanks, and on this score, the numbers looked even
more daunting. Israel’s 2,100 tanks confronted a combined Arab fleet of 4,500. On the
northern front when the war began, Syria massed 1,400 tanks against 177 Israeli
vehicles — a crushing ratio of 8 to 1. Given the extraordinary disparity of force, after
Israel recovered from initial losses and decisively won the war, most Western observers
interpreted the conflict as proof of Israel’s unbreakable will to survive. Yet when
Marshall analyzed the numbers, he saw something else entirely.
Tucked into a nondescript section deep within the Pentagon’s labyrinthine rings, the
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Office of Net Assessment had been created just months before. As ONA’s director,
Marshall, a mathematical whiz kid from Rand, quickly set about his mission: to assess
Superior force, by standard measures, did not win. The number that truly counted was 
the one that revealed a tank’s likely longevity. Counting tanks before the war was a 
necessary but insufficient exercise. It didn’t tell you what you needed to know for 
assessing the net strength of each side in the conflict.
“What impressed me about the ’73 war,” Marshall explains, “was how asymmetric it 
was. Israel was not only much better prepared to recover and repair its tanks, it also 
dominated the battlefield, making recovery possible.”
When Marshall and his analysts next looked at the Soviet Union’s capacity for repairs,
they found that the U.S. had a distinct and meaningful advantage. The bulk of the Soviet
forces were composed of conscripts, young men compelled to serve for two years in the
army or three in the navy. Most were poorly trained and lacking technical know-how.
American soldiers conversely were given better, longer and more specialized training.
Each U.S. unit working on ships or aircraft contained men able to perform some repairs
when necessary. The Soviet military didn’t work that way. Most of the time, when an
engine or other critical part of an aircraft, tank or ship malfunctioned, the Soviets had to
send that part back to a depot or factory for repair. The Soviet Air Force, for example,
purchased six engines for each engine position on its aircraft. The U.S. bought only 1¼
— a dramatic cost-saving measure when multiplied by thousands of planes. Those costs,
of course, counted not just in rubles, but in time. The Soviet delays in servicing aircraft
parts meant that American planes would be available more of the time when needed
most.
The simple and seemingly insignificant difference in repair capabilities meant that
Soviet forces would come under extreme pressure during a protracted fight. Ensuring
that America could continue to strike and engage the Soviets in a prolonged military
conflict meant that the U.S. would ultimately have the advantage. It was this type of
thinking that contributed to America’s Cold War strategy. In Marshall’s case, the insight
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the military balance between competing militaries. Marshall, a mathematical whiz kid 
from Rand, quickly set about his mission: to assess the military balance between 
competing militaries. Studying the war’s less-glamorous details and drawing on the 
substantial research of others, Marshall and his team discovered an Egyptian army with 
a Soviet-style flaw. The entire military was astonishingly short on maintenance 
capabilities. When one of its tanks became damaged in battle, Egypt had no effective 
means for repairing it. Israel, in contrast, had well-trained technicians able to make 
rapid repairs. It turned out that on average Israeli tanks returned to battle three times, 
but Egyptian tanks were used only until damaged. In other words, the initial number of 
tanks was not the number that mattered.
derived not from sophisticated technology but from a probing of the enemy’s
underlying strategic constraints.
Most of today’s so-called “futurists” are handsomely compensated consultants paid to
pontificate on unknowable events. Marshall, in sharp contrast, has spent decades
focused largely on the factors that shape the comparative performances of military
forces. His success in the Cold War came in large part from careful attention to the
numbers and patterns that mattered most — the ones that constrained enemy
behavior. Many credit him with contributing to the policy of spending the Soviet
Union into bankruptcy. He allegedly encouraged shifting U.S. defense expenditures to
long-range bombers, which forced the Soviets to invest in costly air-defense systems,
though Marshall would not confirm this. Perhaps it was this seeming inscrutability,
maybe his political longevity, or simply his age that earned him the affectionate
nickname “Yoda.”
Few other Washington insiders have such a swirl of legend surrounding them. At age
90, Marshall is deeply engaged in running ONA’s affairs. The office churns out
countless reports analyzing military and strategic issues ranging across the globe,
examining everything from advances in neuropharmacology to Swedish innovations
in submarine design to the future of micro-robot warriors, always with an eye to their
impact on American national security. ONA’s reports, most of them highly classified,
would be written for the highest level decision-makers: the secretary of defense and
his deputies. The fact that Marshall has remained ONA’s sole director since its
inception, serving eight presidents and 11 defense secretaries over the past 38 years,
suggests that he either is exceedingly astute at political survival, or provides a product
of substantial value, or both.
In 1972, Marshall was serving on the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger
when President Nixon ordered the creation of a new group within the NSC, one that
Marshall would later lead. This group would be charged with an entirely different
mission; it would look ahead to the strategic environment that the military would
likely face in a decade’s time. It would assess the trends affecting America’s position
vis-à-vis its peer competitor, scrutinizing the relative strengths and weaknesses of
each military competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as those of
their allies. Understanding the net balance in these competitions enabled strategists to
ask what opportunities were being missed, which strengths needed to be bolstered
and which weaknesses could be exploited. It also helped strategic planners envision
how adversaries might assess and attack America’s vulnerabilities. In November 1973,
the group moved into the Pentagon to become the Office of Net Assessment. Marshall
has remained its director ever since.
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From 1976 to 1978, ONA’s attention focused on Soviet strategy in northern Europe.
In contemplating the Soviets’ likely moves in a European war, U.S. experts assumed
that part of Soviet strategy would involve an attack down through Norway. The
Barents Sea port at Murmansk represented Russia’s westernmost border of
northern Europe. If Soviet forces did move aggressively at any point along the
borders between NATO and Warsaw Pact states, the U.S. was committed to a rapid
deployment of 10 American divisions to reinforce the central front of NATO — a
massive and costly undertaking. Most analysts assumed that the Soviets would send
their attack submarines into the Atlantic to disrupt American deployments, but
some military observers had noticed a surprising anomaly in Soviet naval
operations. Although U.S. attack submarines were positioned to intercept Soviet
subs if they moved out from the Barents Sea, the Soviets were holding their subs
back. They were not conducting operations as expected. Something didn’t add up.
“One of the things that happens from time to time,” Marshall says, “is that you have
to revise your entire notion of how your opponent sees things.” After reviewing fresh
analysis of Soviet doctrine and intentions, Marshall concluded that the Soviets
actually saw this whole region in largely defensive terms. “I remembered something
that Norwegian military officials had said to me a decade earlier in 1964. They
realized that the Soviets must have viewed that sea region as essential to their air-
defense perimeter and they would want to push their air defenses out.” The Soviets,
Marshall concluded, wanted to create and protect a bastion for their strategic
missile submarines as well.
“Your view of what the enemy is up to and what he is thinking can shift very
rapidly,” Marshall says. “New data can surprise you and cause you to revise both
your assessment of the enemy and the appropriateness of your strategy.”
No high-tech surveillance or cloak-and-dagger spies were needed to change the U.S.
perceptions of Soviet behavior. Years of studying Soviet strategy was necessary but
not sufficient. This shift in understanding required a careful study of the key drivers
motivating enemy behavior.
In 1988, America’s foremost strategic thinkers met at Harvard to cast their eyes just
20 years ahead. Marshall presided over the gathering, and many of his protégés
contributed their expertise. In a studious final report summarizing their
discussions, the experts soberly concluded that by 2008 the Soviet economy would
have probably declined. They were right.
If in-depth analysis of a society’s underlying trends truly aids prediction, many
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people have asked why those who were most invested in predicting international
affairs — experts in government like Marshall or scholars of international
relations theory — failed so stunningly to foresee the Soviet Union’s demise.
Marshall maintains that his office came closer than others in seeing the decline of
the Soviet Union, though it did not predict the collapse.
According to Marshall, in 1988 the CIA estimated that the Soviet economy stood
at about 60 percent of the U.S. economy. ONA, in contrast, recognized it as not
more than one-third or one-quarter the size of the U.S. economy. Experts at the
time underestimated the percentage of the Soviet gross domestic product devoted
to military spending. Most thought it was only around 12 percent. ONA believed
correctly, Marshall says, that it was actually 30 percent to 35 percent.
Nonetheless, he admits that he was surprised by the events just one year after the
Harvard conference. He told Wired magazine: “I thought they were in trouble, but
the rapidity and completeness of the withdrawal were really striking.”
On the epic event of the Cold War’s end, ONA and everyone else was caught off
guard. Of course, the aim of ONA’s futurism is not to predict precise occurrences
on specific dates. Instead, it is to gain insights into how long-term trends will
likely affect the relative position of U.S. military forces. This raises the question of
why the U.S. has seemed so ill-equipped to confront the type of asymmetric
warfare it has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the past decade the U.S. military
has found itself engaged against AK47-wielding, improvised-explosive-device-
planting insurgents in developing countries, rather than confronting a genuine
peer competitor. Marshall does not speak about those conflicts. ONA remains
wedded to its mission: to prepare for the farther future.
The China conflict
Today Marshall’s office thinks about new types of warfare, such as with robotics,
and changing warfare areas such as in the deep seas or outer space. Now that
many more nations have access to space, ONA asks if America’s advantage there
is eroding. ONA also contemplates where countries such as China will be by
midcentury. Some worry that a fixation on China as a peer competitor will act as a
self-fulfilling prophecy. By anticipating future conflict, they argue, the U.S.
military builds the weapons systems specifically appropriate for combating the
Chinese state. China, aware of these U.S. plans, the argument continues, prepares
to counter an American threat, and before long a conflict becomes unavoidable, or
at least more likely. It’s a classic security dilemma, where as one side perceives a
threat and prepares to defend against it, the other side perceives the first side’s
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defensive preparations as offensive and in turn it prepares for war. An arms
race ensues that could, some believe, destabilize relations, making war more
likely.
Marshall is optimistic about U.S.-China relations. “In the end,” he predicts, “I
don’t think we will revert to the kind of relations with China that we had with
the Soviets.” Although he does not foresee another Cold War coming, Marshall
points out that the Chinese are facing serious long-term challenges, from water
shortages to demographic troubles, which will likely constrict its economic
growth rate. Nonetheless, the Chinese military is focused on the U.S. as a
potential future competitor. And China’s ambition is clearly to rise in military,
not just economic power. So Marshall perceives the Chinese military as focused
on America as a future competitor, and in turn he and no doubt many others in
the defense establishment think it best to see China the same way.
Lessons
A study of the work performed by Marshall and his colleagues at ONA offers
two important lessons for strategic planners.
• Focus on small-scale predictions.
Everyone knows that governments have little choice but to plan for the future,
and that requires estimates of long-term trends. Yet Marshall’s experience
suggests that predicting individual or small-group behavior is not simply more
manageable, it is also more fruitful, than forecasting large-scale societal
transformations. Just as ONA’s experts on Soviet behavior missed the Soviet
Union’s collapse, no one in today’s intelligence community appears to have
foreseen the transformations occurring across the Arab world. These kinds of
predictions are rarely possible. The more useful predictions restrict themselves
to the actions that an enemy can control.
• We can learn to think like the enemy.
The stories above also indicate that knowing one’s enemy is a skill, but it is an
ability we can learn to improve. It takes a keen focus on the other side’s less
obvious, underlying drivers and constraints — which are significantly different
from intentions and capabilities. Marshall achieved this during the Cold War by
combining expertise with a willingness to engage alternative sources and ideas.
Using the Yom Kippur War analysis to view Soviet constraints in the Cold War
was a thoughtful way of applying insights across contexts. Naturally, one can
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easily go awry by applying lessons to nonanalogous cases. The aim is not to
take a lesson from one experience and graft it capriciously onto another. It is
instead to use new ways of thinking about conflicts based on a range of
approaches. In the Barents Sea incident, for example, Marshall drew on
insights from the Norwegian military to reconceptualize American
perspectives on Soviet behavior. The Norwegians could just as easily have
been wrong about Soviet intentions. The point is that adopting a foreign
perspective enabled ONA to reconsider its assumptions. Once it did, the
picture of Soviet behavior looked completely different: transforming from
offensive to defensive in nature. And with that perspective, the puzzle pieces
fit more sensibly in place.
ZACHARY SHORE is an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
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